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Commentary by Co-Defendant's Counsel on Defendant's
Refusal To Testify: A Violation of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination?
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution protects the
individual from being compelled in any criminal case to testify against
himself. 1 Under the framework of the American criminal justice system, the state bears the full responsibility for proving the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The fifth amendment ensures that in
this endeavor the defendant will not be forced to aid or contribute to
the state's case. Furthermore, the defendant's choice to remain silent
at his trial should not influence the traditional presumption of innocence. 2 The jury is typically instructed that a defendant is presumed
innocent independent of his decision to testify. 3
The defendant's decision on whether to testify is by no means an
easy one. If he takes the stand he risks that his appearance or mannerisms may prejudice the jury against him and that his prior criminal
convictions may be highlighted. 4 Additionally, the defendant faces the
prosecutor's clever questioning and the associated strain, embarrassment, and confusion. On the other hand, if a defendant chooses not to
testify he risks jury speculation about his motivations for remaining
silent, speculation which often, and some argue justifiably, runs to a
presumption of guilt. 5
Compounding the defendant's dilemma is the possibility that the
prosecutor or a co-defendant's counsel will comment to the jury on his
decision to remain silent. The Supreme Court has held prosecutorial
comments on a defendant's courtroom silence to be a violation of a
defendant's fifth amendment rights. 6 A similar threat to a defendant's
privileged silence arises in multiple-defendant criminal trials when the
attorney for one of the testifying defendants contrasts his client's willingness to testify with another defendant's silence. The suggestion to
1. The fifth amendment states, in relevant part, "nor shall [any person] be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ..•." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See 1 E. DEVITT & c. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 17.14 (3d ed. 1977).
3. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981) (nontestifying defendant has a constitutional
right to ajury instruction that explains the invocation of the fifth amendment does not affect the
presumption of innocence until proved guilty).
4. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
6. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
Adverse comment by the trial judge concerning defendant's refusal to testify is also prohibited.
See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 338-41 (1978) (approving non·adverse comment by trial
judge); infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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the jury that the act of testifying should be rewarded while the decision to exercise a constitutional right should be penalized is deeply
troubling.
Currently, the circuits are divided on whether comments by codefendants' counsel on a defendant's silence impair that defendant's
fifth amendment rights. 7 Furthermore, among the circuits that regard
such commentary as potentially prejudicial, disagreement exists over
the proper test for identifying such comments. This Note asserts that
the risk of prejudicing a defendant's fifth amendment rights is too
great to allow counsel any comment on a defendant's decision to testify or to remain silent.
Part I of this Note examines the historical evolution of the privilege against self-incrimination and the policy goals behind the privilege. The Note argues that prohibiting comments on silence by codefendant's counsel is consistent with the fifth amendment's historical
purpose and subsequent interpretation. Part II considers the Supreme
Court's decision in Griffin v. California 8 and later decisions concerning commentary on courtroom silence and applies analytical models
derived from these decisions to the issue of co-defendant's commentary. Finally, Part III examines the circuit courts' attempts to define a
standard for identifying comments made by co-defendant's counsel
that prejudice a defendant's privileged silence. This Part concludes by
demonstrating the insufficiency of the current tests and by advocating
a new standard which prohibits all commentary on the act of testifying or on the limitations imposed on some defendants by another defendant's silence.
!.

HISTORICAL PURPOSES OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Analysis of prejudicial comment by a co-defendant's counsel on a
defendant's refusal to testify must begin with an examination of the
fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 9 A relatively
brief Clause, it provides: "nor shall [any person] be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ...." 10 To understand
7. The Sixth Circuit has rejected fifth amendment challenges to comments on defendant's
silence made by co-defendant's counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985). The First, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
allowed fifth amendment challenges to co-defendant's comments on silence, using a variety of
standards to identify such comments. See, e.g., United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 110 (1989); United States v. McClure, 734 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113
(1st Cir. 1976). See infra Part III.
8. 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that a prosecutor's comments on a defendant's decision not
to testify violate the defendant's fifth amendment rights).
9. See Moreland, Historical Background and Implications of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 44 KY. L.J. 267, 267 (1956) ("A study of the privilege against self-incrimination, as
with other issues involving the law, should begin with a history of the privilege.").
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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how such an opaque command could conceivably be violated by courtroom commentary on someone's refusal to testify, it is helpful to examine the evolution of the fifth amendment and its historic purpose. 11
This Part explores the development of the privilege against selfincrimination. First, this Part traces the historical common law development of the privilege. The discussion focuses on the language of the
privilege as ultimately adopted in the fifth amendment. Next, the theoretical justifications for the privilege offered by courts and commentators are examined. Finally, this Part reviews the Supreme Court's
treatment of the privilege against self-incrimination and concludes
that the prohibition of courtroom commentary on a defendant's silence by his co-defendant's counsel is consistent with the privilege's
historical purpose and judicial interpretation.
A. Historical Development of the Fifth Amendment
An examination of the origins and maturation of the privilege
against self-incrimination adds insight into its scope. In this vein,
Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit, in a grand homage to the fifth
amendment, once wrote: "The history of the development of the right
of silence is a history of accretions, not of an avulsion." 12
The concept of an accused's privilege against self-incrimination extends as far back as the twelfth century. 13 During this period, bishops
attempted to question suspects about a range of offenses, while the
king sought to limit the bishops' questioning to purely ecclesiastical
subjects. 14 In the sixteenth century the privilege arose with respect to
the English Court of High Commission. That court claimed to have
inherited from the ecclesiastical courts of the middle ages the right to
administer the so-called "oath ex officio." Persons who had fallen
under suspicion regarding their faith or morals were required to take
this oath, and a refusal to do so was taken as confession of the offense
charged. While there is some debate over the scope of the privilege at
this time, the Latin maxim "Nemo tenetur prodere se ipsum" - "no
one should be required to accuse himself" - emerged as a frequent
protest against the "oath." 15 Despite this maxim, the period was
marked by the use of torture to extract testimony and confessions
from criminal suspects. 16 By the 1700s, however, it was settled under
11. In the words of Justice Frankfurter: "The privilege against self-incrimination is a specific
provision of which it is peculiarly true that 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic.' "
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256
U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
12. De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1962) (footnote omitted).
13. E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 2 (1962).
14. Id.
15. See De Luna, 308 F.2d at 147 n.17; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 13, at 2; Corwin, The
Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1930).
16. See z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 188 (1954); E. GRISWOLD, supra note 13,
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the English common law that no person could be required under oath
to answer questions posed to him by a court.17
The Puritans who settled America carried with them strong opposition to the inquisitorial system of justice. 18 Trials conducted in Massachusetts as early as 1637 provide evidence of the privilege. 19 Other
groups of settlers also strove to set the new colonies on a distinct
course away from forced confessions. Section 8 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 provides that a person may not "be compelled
to give evidence against himself," 20 and by 1784 six other state constitutions had granted a similar privilege against self-incrimination.21
James Madison proposed the privilege against self-incrimination at
the Constitutional Convention in 1789.22 With regard to this proposal, Professor Levy has noted:
In presenting his amendments, Madison said nothing whatever that explained his intentions concerning the self-incrimination clause. Nor do
his papers or correspondence illuminate his meaning. We have only the
language of his proposal, and that revealed an intent to incorporate into
the Constitution the whole scope of the common-law right. 23

Yet, Professor Levy does note that by placing this privilege in the Bill
of Rights the Framers "were once again sounding the tocsin against
the dangers of government oppression of the individual .... " 24 Professor Levy concludes:
Above all, the Fifth Amendment reflected [the Framers'] judgment that
in a free society, based on respect for the individual, the determination of
at 2; L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 33-35 (1968) (torture used during preliminary examination by justice of the peace and by Privy Council and the Court of the Star Chamber). But see Ellis, Vox Populi v. Suprema Lex: A Comment on the Testimonial Privilege of the
Fifth Amendment, 55 IOWA L. REv. 829, 835 (1970) (noting that torture was prohibited under
the common law).
17. See De Luna, 308 F.2d at 148; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 13, at 3-4; L. LEVY, supra note
16, at 313; Corwin, supra note 15, at 9.
18. See De Luna, 308 F.2d at 148; cf. L. LEVY, supra note 16, at 339-54; Pittman, The
Colonial and Constitutional History ofthe Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA.
L. REV. 763, 775-83 (1935).
19. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 13, at 4.
20. VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS§ 8 (1776). The modern constitution of Virginia incorporated this
pronouncement and now prohibits compulsion "in any criminal proceeding." See VA. CoNsr.
art. I, § 8; see also L. LEVY, supra note 16, at 405-06; Pittman, supra note 18, at 787-88.
21. See MD. CoNST. art. 22; MAss. CoNsr. pt. l, art. XII; N.H. CoNsr. pt. l, art. XV; N.C.
CoNsr. art. 1, § 23; PA. CONsr. art. I,§ 9; VT. CoNsr. ch. I, art. 10.
22. L. LEVY, supra note 16, at 422. Professor Chafee notes that in 1788 Patrick Henry
opposed the ratification of the Constitution because it failed to include a privilege against selfincrimination. Henry protested that without such a protection "Congress may introduce the
practice of torturing to extort a confession of the crime." Chafee concludes that one reason for
including the clause against self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights was to quiet such objections.
Z. CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 188.
23. L. LEVY, supra note 16, at 423; see also McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy,
1967 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 194 (noting the dearth of historical information on the fifth
amendment).
24. L. LEVY, supra note 16, at 430.
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guilt or innocence by just procedures, in which the accused made no
unwilling contribution to his conviction, was more important than punishing the guilty. 25

The evolution of the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination does little to indicate its application to the present problem. The language of the clause does, however, suggest a broad
reading of the right. The amendment proposed by Madison and ultimately ratified by the states from 1789 to 1791 is "far more comprehensive than a [mere] prohibition against self-incrimination."26 By its
very terms the clause proscribes compulsion to be a witness against
oneself. Consequently, a criminal defendant does not need to fear
criminal prosecution to invoke the right; aversion to public disgrace or
fear of public speaking are sufficient reasons for choosing not to testify.
With this rather empty historical record and the broad language of the
amendment, one notion is clear: no evidence exists that the fifth
amendment does not apply to co-defendant commentary on silence.
B. Policy Goals Behind the Privilege
Identifying the policy goals behind the privilege against self-incrimination is cumbersome, yet critical. The dozen or so words in the
Bill of Rights provide little guidance, and the privilege's dyspeptic
path through history is no more enlightening. 27 In determining how
to construe the privilege it is best to look at the policies that legal
commentators and the courts have advanced as its justification.
Professor Wigmore, in his famous treatise on evidence, identifies
twelve policy justifications in support of the privilege advanced by
legal scholars ranging from Jeremy Bentham to Dean Erwin Griswold. 28 Wigmore rejects eight of these twelve reasons as "makeweights," "platitudes," and repetitions of other policy goals, and
concludes that only four merit serious consideration. 29 The four justifications that truly provide support for the fifth amendment are: (1)
the prevention of torture, by which Wigmore means the coercive use
of inhumane force (psychological or emotional) to overcome a witness'

25. Id. at 432; see also Pittman, supra note 18, at 789 ("The provision ••• against compulsory
self-incrimination not only was an answer to numerous instances of colonial misrule but also was
a shield against the evils that lurk in the shadows of a new and untried sovereignty.").
26. See L. LEVY, supra note 16, at 423.
27. As one commentator has noted: "it is now generally agreed that the 'noble principle' of
the privilege 'transcends its origins.' " McKay, supra note 23, at 195.
28. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2251, at 297-318 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
29. The eight justifications for the privilege dismissed by Prof. Wigmore are:
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reluctance to disclose; 30 (2) a means to frustrate "bad laws" and "bad
procedure,'' especially in the area of political and religious beliefs; 31
(3) protection against vague charges, and unprincipled inquiry into
matters of dubious social concern; 32 and (4) the assurance of a fair
balance of power between the individual and the government that
forces the government to leave an individual alone until it has, relying
entirely on its own means, developed sufficient proof of wrongdoing. 33
It is from the last policy rationale that one can confidently defend
the applicability of fifth amendment protection to a defendant whose
silence has been remarked upon by a co-defendant's counsel. With
respect to the fourth policy, Justice Fortas has commented that, "[t]he
principle that a man is not obliged to furnish the state with ammunition to use against him is basic to this conception. . . . A sovereign
state ... has no right to compel the sovereign individual to surrender
or impair his right of self-defense." 34 To this body of policy, Professor
Ayer has added: "The concept of an adversary trial, with the judge
acting primarily as a referee in a struggle between equals - indeed
between sovereigns - carries into practice this idea of equality in a
way that the inquisitorial system of the civil-law countries does not." 35
Allowing a co-defendant to draw into question another defendant's
refusal to testify produces a perception of unfairness. This visceral
reaction may seem intuitively troubling since the co-defendant's coun(1) It protects the innocent defendant from convicting himself by a bad performance on
the witness stand...•
(2) It avoids burdening the courts with false testimony....
(3) It encourages third-party witnesses to appear and testify by removing the fear that
they might be compelled to incriminate themselves; ...
(4) It is a recognition of the practical limits of governmental power; truthful self-incriminating answers cannot be compelled, so why try....
(5) It prevents procedures of the kind used by the infamous courts of Star Chamber,
High Commission and Inquisition.•..
(6) It is justified by history, whose tests it has stood; the tradition which it has created is
a satisfactory one....
(7) It preserves respect for the legal process by avoiding situations which are likely to
degenerate into undignified, uncivilized and regrettable scenes..••
(8) It spurs the prosecutor to do a complete and competent independent investigation.
Id. at 310-12.
30. See id. at 315-17.
31. See id. at 313-14; But sees. HOOK, CoMMON SENSE AND THE FIFfH AMENDMENT 63
(1957) (arguing that "in a democracy there are more effective ways of contesting bad laws .••.").
32. Here, Wigmore views the privilege as a means to prevent purely bothersome and burdensome questioning. He contends that "[e]ach of us, after all, is a criminal more or less, [but it
goes] without saying that the law does not intend that all of these crimes be prosecuted." 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 28, at 314-15.
33. Id. at 313-18.
34. Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEV. B.A.J. 91, 9899 (1954).
35. Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. California
After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. R.Ev. 841, 851 (1980).
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sel cannot be clearly placed on either side of this "struggle between
equals." Yet, when counsel attempts to bolster his own client's credibility by contrasting him with a silent defendant, counsel is no longer
outside of the bipolar balance, but is aiding the state's case. The jump
itself is not so disturbing; due to judicial reluctance to grant severance,
co-defendants often try to implicate each other. 36 The means by
which co-defendants implicate each other, however, demands judicial
attention. Allowing a defendant to comment on his co-defendant's silence forces the nontestifying defendant to aid the state's case against
his will. If the state, by denying severance, is willing to accept the aid
of a defendant in the conviction of a co-defendant, it must require the
testifying defendant to operate under the same standards as the state.
Therefore, if the constitution demands that the state refrain from comment on defendant's silence, the same demand must be made of a codefendant to ensure realistic constitutional protection.
Some still question the rationality of presuming the innocence of
silent defendants. A number of fifth amendment critics have argued
that the privilege against self-incrimination is merely a shield for the
guilty. 37 These critics raise the basic argument that if a defendant
were innocent he would gladly take the stand and proclaim it; only a
guilty defendant would fear a prosecutor's questioning. 38
This chain of reasoning, however, ignores the host of compelling
reasons that might lead a defendant to refuse to testify. 39 The defen36. See infra note 141.
37. See, e.g., S. HOOK, supra note 31, at 62-63; Ayer, supra note 3S, at 846, 8SS-S7; McKay,
supra note 23, at 208. Even Dean Griswold, who had the courage to defend the privilege against
self-incrimination during its moment of peril - the McCarthy hearings - later accepted the
argument that "the privilege protects the guilty more often than it does the innocent. It was a
mistake, I now think, to undertake to defend the privilege on the ground that it is basically
designed to protect those innocent of crime, at least in any numerical sense." Griswold, The
Right to Be Let Alone, SS Nw. U. L. REv. 216, 223 (1960); cf. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 13.
38. See Ayer, supra note 3S, at 8SS & n.S7.
39. See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OP
CRIMINAL CASES § 390, at 2-299 (1967); E. GRISWOLD, supra note 13, at 20-21; Ayer, supra
note 3S, at 8SS-S6 & n.S7; Bradley, Griffin v. California: Still Viable After All These Year.I', 79
MICH. L. REV. 1290, 1293 & n.18 (1981); Ellis, supra note 16, at 846-48; Poulin, Evidentiary Use
of Silence and the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, S2 GEO. WASH. L. RBV.
191, 222-23 (1984); Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
24 U. CHI. L. REV. 472, 492-93 (19S7).
The Supreme Court also has noted on several occasions compelling reasons other than guilt
that keep defendants off the stand. In Lakeside v. Oregon, 43S U.S. 333, 343 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), Justice Stevens stated: "Every trial lawyer knows that some truthful denials of guilt
may be considered incredible by a jury - either because of their inherent improbability or because their explanation, under cross-examination, will reveal unfavorable facts about the witness
or his associates." Furthermore, in Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893), the Court
recognized:
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely innocent of
the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting
to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged against him, will
often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than remove
prejudices against him.
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dant may wish not to testify because: (1) he fears that his nervousness
or appearance might prejudice the jury against him despite his innocence;40 (2) he desires that his prior criminal record not be brought to
the jury's attention;41 (3) he disapproves of the tribunal or of the accusations against him and does not want to participate in such proceedings; or (4) he does not want to reveal suspicious facts that might tend
to incriminate his friends, family, or associates. Consequently, one invoking this constitutional protection should not necessarily be presumed guilty, and further, a co-defendant's counsel should not be
allowed to encourage the prohibited inference of guilt. 42
C. Supreme Court's Treatment of the Fifth Amendment

A careful reading of the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the
fifth amendment provides further insight into the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination. The Court has stated that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination marks "an important advance in the development of our liberty - 'one of the great landmarks
in man's struggle to make himself civilized.' " 43 As for the purposes of
the protection, the Court has offered a host of justifications that range
from the protection of innocent persons to the maintenance of an equitable justice system.44 In Miranda v. Arizona the Court noted that
the privilege against self-incrimination - the essential mainstay of our
adversary system - is founded on a complex of values.... All these
policies point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a government - state or federal
- must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. . .. . [O]ur
accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own
independent labors. . . . In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the
person is guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will."45
40. As one commentator has stated:
It must be borne in mind that a substantial number of defendants are innocent, and that
most of these are uneducated, unfortunate persons, frightened by their predicament - no
match for the prosecutor or for the occasional sharp question from the judge. Such persons
in a human attempt to escape the long finger of suspicious circumstances would undoubtedly trip themselves over an inconsistency or contradiction when and if they take the stand.
Clapp, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 541, 548 (1956) (footnote
omitted).
41. See c. McCoRMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 43 (1954).
42. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
43. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (quoting E. GRISWOLD, supra note
13, at 7); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) ("[The fifth amendment] reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations ....").
44. For a comprehensive list of policy justifications including maintenance of a fair stateindividual balance, the inviolability of the human personality, and the protection of the innocent,
see Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55; see also Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414-16 (1966).
45. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. l, 8
(1964)) (emphasis added).
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With these thoughts in mind, it is difficult to accept that prejudicial remarks on a defendant's silence by co-defendant's counsel
amount to the state's production of evidence "by its own independent
labors." Moreover, when a defendant is aware that his refusal totestify may be brought to the jury's attention, often with an implication
of his guilt, his decision to enjoy his fifth amendment rights is clearly
not "unfettered." In the words of Justice Black, "[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for
relying on them."46
Furthermore, construing the fifth amendment to prohibit such
conduct is consistent with the broad construction which the Supreme
Court has historically accorded the fifth amendment. As the Court
has stated, "[t]o apply the privilege narrowly or begrudgingly - to
treat it as an historical relic, at most merely to be tolerated - is to
ignore its development and purpose."47 The circuit courts have also
adopted a broad, policy-based construction; one court, faced with remarks by co-defendant's counsel, stated: "It is more important to consider [the fifth amendment's] line of growth as indicative of an
expanding right capable of encompassing new and novel situations today as in the past."48
The protection of the privilege against self-incrimination should
not be constrained by vague categorizations which portray a prosecutor or judge's comment on silence as an impermissible violation of defendant's rights49 and a co-defendant's counsel's remark as mere
colloquy. 50 The privilege has historically sought to prevent direct coercion by the state or coercion engineered by state actors. That this
coercion comes to us in a new form should not deter its prevention.
While the history of the privilege against self-incrimination prior
to its inclusion in the fifth amendment sheds little light on its intended
purpose, legal commentators and the Supreme Court have since provided elucidation of this constitutional protection. In order to satisfy
the identified goals of maintaining a fair balance of power between the
individual and the state and of allowing a choice of silence that does
not affect the traditional presumption of innocence, it follows that codefendant commentary on silence must be prohibited.
46. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 425 (1957) (Black, J., concurring).
47. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955); see Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422, 426 (1956) ("This constitutional protection must not be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly
spirit.").
48. De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 150 (5th Cir. 1962); see also Gompers v. United
States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1915) (The significance of constitutional provisions "is to be gathered
not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of
their growth.").
49. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837
(1985); see infra text accompanying notes 107-10.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court's evaluation of the fifth amendment's purpose indicates that the Court views the protections offered
as an integral element in the maintenance of an equally balanced adversary process. This ideal is compromised gravely by allowing one
defendant to make statements that would be prohibited if made by the
state, which have precisely the same adverse effect on the silent defendant's constitutional rights and which are predicated on the court's the state's - acquiescence. Furthermore, state involvement is readily
apparent in the prosecutor's initial decision to try two defendants together who have divergent approaches to testimony. In response to
those who would argue that the fifth amendment does not prohibit cocounsel's comment because the amendment restricts only state action,
one must not overlook the state's vital role in joining defendants and
denying severance. 51 With this understanding of the development of
the privilege against self-incrimination, the next Part examines the
Supreme Court's decisions on prosecutorial commentary on a defendant's silence.

II. THE

SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF COURTROOM
COMMENTARY ON DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL To TESTIFY

In considering whether comment by co-defendant's counsel works
as a violation of defendant's fifth amendment rights, it is instructive to
examine the line of Supreme Court cases regarding comment on courtroom silence. Although the Supreme Court has not spoken directly to
the specific issue of a co-defendant's comment on silence, the Court
has considered how a prosecutor's comments can impair defendant's
right to silence. This Part analyzes the theory behind the Court's
holdings in these cases, particularly Griffin v. California 52 where the
Court barred prosecutorial comments on defendant's silence. This
Part also examines co-defendant's commentary on silence using analytical models provided by commentators and the Supreme Court. An
51. Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit aptly captured the state's involvement in co-defendant's commentary on silence:
The Federal Government cannot wash its hands of responsibility for the compulsion to
testify resulting from the court's inaction. The exclusive control of the conduct of the trial is
in the hands of the presiding federal judge. He is "not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions
of law." He has the decisive role in assuring an accused a fair trial according to federal
standards. "Federal judges are not referees at prize fights but functionaries of justice."
De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 153 (5th Cir. 1962) (footnotes omitted). Furthermore,
in Griffin v. California, where prosecutorial comment on silence was held unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court noted the instrumental role of the judge in aiding this constitutional violation:
"What the jury may infer [from the defendant's silence], given no help from the court, is one
thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence
against him is quite another." 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (emphasis added). Crucially, the Griffin
court's statement applies equally to co-defendant's comments on silence. The court's inquiry
focuses on the burdening of the defendant's rights and on the judicial acceptance of this coercive
pressure, and not on the identity of the commentator. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
52. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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assessment of co-defendant commentary on silence within the "impermissible burden" and "prohibited inference" models reveals that permitting co-defendants to comment on a defendant's refusal to testify is
unconstitutional.

A.

The Pre-Griffin Commentary Cases

Although decided on statutory grounds, and not on fifth amendment grounds, Wilson v. United States 53 has had tremendous impact
on how the lower courts have dealt with the problem of identifying
comments prejudicial to silence. 54 In Wilson, the Supreme Court reviewed petitioner's federal prosecution on charges of using the mails to
provide information on obscene materials. During the trial, in which
petitioner chose not to testify, the prosecutor stated in his closing argument: "[I]f I am ever charged with a crime ... I will go upon the
stand and hold up my hand before high Heaven and testify to my innocence of the crime."55 In response to the defendant's objection, the
judge said: "Yes, I suppose the counsel should not comment upon the
defendant not taking the stand." 56 The Supreme Court held this exchange violated a federal law which provides that in trials before federal courts the defendant shall be allowed, at his own request, to
testify, "'[a]nd his failure to make such request shall not create any
presumption against him.' " 57 The Court reasoned that to insure the
presumption of innocence, "comment, especially hostile comment,
upon such failure [to testify] must necessarily be excluded from the
jury."5B
Wilson prohibited prosecutorial comment on silence in the federal
court system, but did not foreclose it in the state courts. After rejecting one challenge to a California state law allowing such commentary, 59 in 1964 the Supreme Court held in Malloy v. Hogan 60 that the
fourteenth amendment prohibits state infringement of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, the path was
53. 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
54. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
55. 149 U.S. at 62.
56. 149 U.S. at 62.
57. 149 U.S. at 63 (referring to 62 Stat. 833 (1948) as codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1988)
which was drafted to allow a defendant to be a competent witness at his own trial).
58. 149 U.S. at 65.
59. In 1947, the Court rejected a fourteenth amendment challenge to a California law allowing comment on silence by "counsel" in Adamson v. California, holding that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate all of the Bill of Rights guarantees. 332
U.S. 46, 54 (1947). At this time both the Constitution of California, art. I, § 13 and the Penal
Code of California § 1323 permitted commentary on defendant's silence by "counsel." Neither
provision indicated whether "counsel" was meant to encompass a co-defendant's attorney. 332
U.S. at 48 n.3.
60. 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (the Court found t.hat a state court's contempt judgment against petitioner for refusing to testify violated petitioner's fifth amendment rights).
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clear for a challenge to state laws permitting prosecutorial commentary on a defendant's silence.
B. Prosecutorial Comment on Silence and the Fifth Amendment:

Griffin v. California
The Griffin v. California decision is tremendously important for
understanding the Supreme Court's application of the fifth amendment to commentary on silence. 61 In Griffin, the Court used an "impermissible burden" analysis to hold that it was unconstitutional for a
prosecutor to refer to the defendant's invocation of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Co-defendant commentary
on silence is similarly unconstitutional under impermissible burden
analysis. 62
In Griffin, 63 petitioner sought review of his murder conviction in
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. During the trial, in which
petitioner chose not to testify, counsel for the prosecution drew the
jury's attention to the defendant's silence, remarking that the defendant "has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain" the state's
evidence. 64 The prosecution further commented that "in the whole
world, if anybody would know [who committed the murder], this defendant would know. Essie Mae is dead, she can't tell you her side of
the story. The defendant won't." 65 Furthermore, the judge's instruction to the jury on the issue of guilt, while noting defendant's right to
refuse to testify, indicated that the jury was permitted to draw adverse
inferences from defendant's silence. 66 Such remarks by the court and
prosecutor were consistent at that time with the California
Constitution. 67
61. Although Griffin has not been overruled, the Office of Legal Policy of the Department of
Justice has taken the position that Griffin was wrongly decided and provides an unnecessary
impediment to effective criminal prosecution. See Report to the Attorney General on Adverse
Inferences from Silence, 22 MICH. J.L. REFORM 1005 (1989).
62. See infra notes 73-93 and accompanying text.
63. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
64. 380 U.S. at 611.
65. 380 U.S. at 611.
66. Specifically, the judge told the jury:
"As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be expected to
deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or if, though he
does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure into
consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among
the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant
are the more probable."
380 U.S. at 610.
67. Before it was repealed in 1974, CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 13 provided that defendant's "failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be
commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury."
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 610 n.2.
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The Griffin Court found the California law permitting the prosecutor and judge to comment on a defendant's refusal to testify a violation
of the fifth amendment. In so holding, the Court implicitly recognized
that a defendant could be "compelled" to testify when the prosecutor
suggests, but does not directly state, that the defendant's silence masks
guilt. 68 The Court based its decision on the impermissible degree to
which such prosecutorial comments place a cost on silence. 69 According to the Court, such commentary amounts to "a penalty imposed by
courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the
privilege by making its assertion costly." 70
Importantly, the Court treated this cost as a "penalty imposed by
courts," not one imposed by the state.71 This language suggests that
the identity of the commentator is not as important as the effect of
such commentary on the jury. Consequently, a court that acquiesces
to a similar comment by a defendant's attorney in a multiple defendant trial would also be imposing an unconstitutional penalty on silence. The principles underlying Griffin can be fairly applied to codefendant commentary to show its abridgement of the fifth
amendment.
C. Analytical Models for Assessing Fifth Amendment Violations

The reduction of the Supreme Court's analysis in Griffin to analytical models is helpful when considering whether the Court's reasoning
can be faithfully applied to the issue of comment by co-defendant's
counsel. Griffin and the later Supreme Court decision in Lakeside v.
Oregon, 72 yield two analytical models - the "impermissible burden"
68. A troublesome issue for the Court in its analysis of fifth amendment challenges has been
the presence or absence of "compulsion." This issue surfaces because of the wording of the fifth
amendment: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ••.." U.S. CoNsr. amend. V (emphasis added). If the clause is strictly interpreted,
compulsion must be present for there to be a constitutional violation.
The Court has not clearly indicated the contours of "compulsion." Compare Brooks v. Ten·
nessee, 406 U.S. 605, 614 (Burger, J., dissenting) ("It is undisputed that petitioner was not in fact
compelled to be a witness against himself, as he did not take the stand•.•. nor did the Tennessee
procedure subject him to any other significant compulsion to testify other than the compulsion
faced by every defendant who chooses not to take the stand •..• That should end the matter.")
and Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 306 (Powell, J., concurring) ("A defendant who chooses
not to testify hardly can claim that he was compelled to testify") with Lakeside v. Oregon, 435
U.S. 333, 339 (1978) (''The Court concluded in Griffin that unconstitutional compulsion was
inherent in a trial where prosecutor and judge were free to ask the jury to draw adverse infer·
ences from a defendant's failure to take the witness stand."); see also Bradley, supra note 39, at
1296 n.31 (contending that "[w]hile prosecutorial comment arguably does not 'compel' testi·
mony, it may be said to compel self-incrimination. The prosecutor's argument is that the defen·
dant's silence should be considered as evidence against him - that is, that the silence is
incriminating. Thus, incrimination is compulsory by being unavoidable.").
69. See infra text accompanying notes 73-93.
70. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
71. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614 (emphasis added).
72. 435 U.S. 333 (1978); see infra text accompanying notes 96-97.
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approach and the "prohibited inference" approach. These models,
when applied to the present issue, demonstrate that co-defendant's
comment on silence is unconstitutional.
1.

"Impermissible Burden" Analysis

As the Griffin decision suggests, practices which pose an impermissible burden on the exercise of fifth amendment guarantees are unconstitutional.73 A number of commentators have noted that the
Supreme Court, in employing its impermissible-burden analysis, traditionally bases its conclusion on a three-prong test: (1) whether the particular practice burdens exercise of the involved right; (2) whether the
practice impairs the policies underlying the right; and (3) whether a
sufficient government interest warrants such impairment. 74
Comments made by co-defendant's counsel on defendant's silence
are unconstitutional under impermissible-burden analysis. Such comments satisfy the first prong of the test. According to the Court, "the
Griffin case stands for the proposition that a defendant must pay no
court-imposed price for the exercise of his constitutional privilege not
to testify." 75 The Court, by limiting unconstitutional burdens to those
that are "court-imposed," suggests that only practices over which the
court has control demand judicial concern. Certainly, there are prices
on silence that a court can not affect other than with a preemptive
73. Subsequent cases provide additional examples of burdens held by the Court to be impermissible. In Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), the Court held that a judge's refusal,
despite defendant's request, to instruct the jury on defendant's right to silence and the impermissibility of inferences of guilt therefrom violated defendant's fifth amendment rights. Comparing
this situation to prosecutorial comment on silence, the Court noted that "the penalty [on silence]
may be just as severe when there is no adverse comment, but when the jury is left to roam at
large with only its untutored instincts to guide it, to draw from the defendant's silence broad
inferences of guilt." 450 U.S. at 301.
In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), the Court held that a Tennessee statute which
forced defendant to testify prior to any of the other defense witness violated the fifth amendment.
The Court stated that this statute was unconstitutional because it "exacts a price for [defendant's) silence by keeping him off the stand entirely unless he chooses to testify first. This, we
think, casts a heavy burden on a defendant's otherwise unconditional right not to take the
stand." 406 U.S. at 610-11 (footnote omitted).
One other post-Griffin decision suggests that impermissible burden analysis has not been entirely embraced by the court. In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), a Rhode Island
prison inmate was informed that his silence at a prison disciplinary hearing would be held against
him. The Supreme Court upheld the Rhode Island law's presumption of guilt from silence. The
Baxter court maintained that since no criminal proceedings were pending against the prisoner,
Rhode Island's practice conformed with the fifth amendment. 425 U.S. at 317. The Court's
reasoning is curious since the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to proceedings such as a prison disciplinary hearing. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
Essentially, Baxter "cannot be reconciled with the numerous cases holding that the government
is barred from penalizing an individual for exercising the privilege [against self-incrimination] ...." 425 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. See Ayer, supra note 35, at 855; Poulin, supra note 39, at 205-06 (" 'The threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind
the rights involved.' " (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971))).
75. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301 (1981).
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cautionary instruction - for example, the jury's possible equation of
silence with guilt. A comment from a co-defendant's counsel, however, is certainly one practice the court can control. A cautionary instruction to the jury and admonishment of the attorney are well within
a judge's capacity. Yet, when a judge acquiesces in the defense's prejudicial comments, the silent defendant must be said to have suffered a
"court-imposed" penalty on silence.
Moreover, the evidentiary value of such comments is dubious.
Since these comments can easily result in an improper jury inference
and cause a potentially prejudicial error, the court may appropriately
control such commentary upon objection of defendant's counsel. One
commentator has noted a qualitative difference between a factual presumption arising out of defendant's actions and an irrational presumption penalizing a defendant's exercise of a constitutional right. 76 An
example of this distinction can be seen in Barnes v. United States, 77
where the Court upheld the traditional common law inference of guilt
from the unexplained possession of stolen property. The Court stated
that "[i]ntroduction of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending
to implicate the defendant in the alleged crime increases the pressure
on him to testify. The mere massing of evidence against a defendant [,
however,] cannot be regarded as a violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination.'' 78
This factual presumption stands in sharp contrast to the presumption created by allowing a co-defendant to comment on a defendant's
silence. In no respect is it rational to infer guilt from silence. The
Court and various commentators have indicated numerous alternative
rationales for a defendant's silence. 79 Furthermore, since the defendant's decision not to testify is a personal one, it cannot be empirically
proved that the defendant was motivated by any one reason. At least
one Justice has indicated that, with regard to drawing inferences of
guilt or innocence from silence, "[t]here is simply no basis for declaring a generalized probability one way or the other." 80
A co-defendant's comment on silence satisfies the second prong of
the impermissible burden test. Such comments run directly counter to
the policies behind the fifth amendment as identified by the Court. 81
While a defendant is not faced with the "cruel trilemma" of self accusation, perjul')j or contempt that existed prior to fifth amendment protection, he faces a "new trilemma ... perhaps more cruel than the one
76. See Bradley, supra note 39, at 1296 n.35.
77. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
78. 412 U.S. at 847.
79. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
80. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
81. See Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1964); supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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it replaces": self-accusation by affirmative statement, self-accusation
by silence, or perjury. 82 Permitting co-defendant's adverse comment
also destroys the "fair state-individual balance" fortified by the fifth
amendment. 83 The government's role in the criminal justice system is
to produce sufficient evidence to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without relying on the defendant's aid. When courts
allow a co-defendant to represent defendant's silence as guilt, the
state's burden has been lightened against the will of the defendant. 84
The defendant, in this situation, is forced through his decision not to
testify to aid the case against him. If the government cannot compel
defendant's testimony, courts should not allow the defense to compel
it for the state's benefit.
Allowing co-defendant commentary on silence negates the policy
of protecting the "inviolability of the human personality." 85 Once a
defendant has chosen not to testify, the reasons for his choice and his
thoughts remain his, out of the jury's reach. Treating silence as testimonial evidence, however, destroys this privacy and opens a "window
to the defendant's private, unexpressed thoughts." 86
Lastly, the privilege against self-incrimination has historically been
viewed as an institutional protection for the innocent. 87 Allowing a
co-defendant to lead the jury to question the motive behind a defendant's privileged silence imputes guilt to defendant and thus impairs
this function. A defendant may have a number of reasons for refusing
to testify aside from guilt. 88 A court that allows the co-defendant's
suggestion that silence equals guilt to aid the prosecution's case vitiates any protection for the innocent that the fifth amendment purports
to provide.
Under the last prong of the impermissible burden test, the impairment of fifth amendment policies must be balanced against the government's interest in permitting co-defendant commentary on another
defendant's silence. Often, a co-defendant who testifies finds that his
82. Poulin, supra note 39, at 211 (referring to the ramifications of Griffin-type comment, but
applicable here as well).
83. 378 U.S. at 55 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 28, at 317).
84. The state's burden will also be lightened against the will of the defendant whenever a codefendant testifies to facts tending to implicate the defendant. However, when this occurs defendant's fifth amendment protection is not impinged since the co-defendant's testimony constitutes
relevant factual evidence bearing on defendant's guilt. In contrast, comments by co-defendant's
counsel as to defendant's silence do not constitute relevant evidence. The state's burden of proving defendant's guilt has been lightened by the fact that the jury is likely to reason improperly
that silence masks guilt, thereby reducing the state's burden of proof.
85. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
86. Poulin, supra note 39, at 211.
87. 378 U.S. at 55 (the privilege against self-incrimination, "while sometimes 'a shelter to the
guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent' " (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155,
162 (1955))).
88. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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testimony lacks corroboration due to another defendant's silence. 89
On occasion, co-defendant's counsel may, during her closing statement, attempt to explain why her client's story is incomplete by
stressing another defendant's failure to testify and to corroborate.
Although the jury is supposed to base its decision solely on the facts
before it, such explanations ask the jury to assume facts not in evidence. Therefore, not only does this practice demand that the jury
make a highly questionable assumption, but it severely prejudices the
constitutional assertion of privilege by the silent defendant. The legitimacy of counsel's comments on her inability to corroborate her client's story cannot outweigh the damage done to the other defendant's
fifth amendment rights. In essence there is a trade-off. As a matter of
policy and constitutional law, the commentary of the testifying defendant's counsel must be limited.
It is often claimed, or at least suggested by the court, that most
comments on a defendant's silence are only meant to accentuate the
testifying defendant's willingness to testify. 90 The American justice
system, however, provides that a defendant does not have to testify
and therefore should accrue no additional benefit (aside from the content of his testimony) for doing so. The jury should not be encouraged
to reward testimony and penalize silence - doing so is contrary to the
very purpose of the fifth amendment. Furthermore, there is no need to
remind the jury of a co-defendant's failure to testify. Justice Stewart's
dissent in Griffin 91 informs us that "the jury will, of course, realize
this quite evident fact, even though the choice goes unmentioned....
[It is] a fact inescapably impressed on the jury's consciousness." 92 A
testifying co-defendant does not have a sufficient interest in drawing
the jury's attention to a defendant's silence or his own decision to testify to overcome the damage done thereby to the silent defendant's
constitutional rights.93
89. See, e.g., United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 110
(1989). See infra text accompanying notes 133-43.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th Cir. 1981) (counsel for
one of the testifying defendants stated "[s]o I ask you to evaluate and weigh in [my client's] favor
the fact that he took the stand in his own defense and he did not have to"); see generally text
accompanying notes 126-30.
91. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
92. 380 U.S. at 621, 622 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
93. Although no testifying defendant in any reported decision has raised the "missing witness
rule" in support of his decision to comment on a co-defendant's silence, this argument merits
some attention. The missing or uncalled witness rule owes its origin to Graves v. United States,
150 U.S. 118 (1893), where the Supreme Court, in dictum, explained: "The rule even in criminal
cases is that if a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony
would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he does not do it creates the presumption that the
testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable." 150 U.S. at 121. Application of this rule to the
multi-defendant criminal trial in which one or some defendants choose not to testify is dubious at
best. The rule is meant to prevent parties from withholding evidence and witnesses from the
court. Therefore, for an inference to be drawn from a party's failure to present a witness, the
witness must have been within that party's power to call. Clearly, this is not the case when the
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"Prohibited Inference" Analysis

Another model for examining potential violations of constitutional
rights is the "prohibited inference model." 94 Under this framework of
analysis, any inference of guilt drawn from the exercise of the fifth
amendment right to unqualified silence is constitutionally prohibited.
As one commentator suggests, "[t]he appropriate inference to be
drawn from the failure to deny is simply this: a person, guilty or innocent, will deny guilt unless he perceives that the denial will be more
costly than silence."95
The Court used this model in Lakeside v. Oregon, 96 where the petitioner argued that a nontestifying defendant's objections to a jury instruction cautioning the jury not to draw adverse inferences from the
defendant's silence should bar the judge from giving this instruction.
The prosecution reasoned that Griffin prohibited any comment by the
state or the court on defendant's silence. The Supreme Court stated
that "[i]t is clear from even a cursory review of the facts and the
square holding of the Griffin case that the Court was there concerned
only with adverse comment ...." 97 In making this delineation between adverse and instructive comment, the Court suggests that some
comments will not encourage the jury to draw negative inferences.
The Griffin holding itself has been characterized by one member of the
Court as based on a prohibited-inference analysis. Distinguishing
Brooks v. Tennessee 98 from Griffin, Justice Burger stated that "the jury
[was not] authorized or encouraged to draw perhaps unwarranted inferences from [defendant's] silence, as in Griffin v. California. " 99
Examining the present debate under the prohibited inference
model, it is clear that the practice of co-defendant commentary on
silence urges the jury to infer guilt from defendant's privileged silence.
Even comments that "merely highlight" a co-defendant's willingness
to testify encourage a prohibited inference. By reaffirming a co-defendant's cooperativeness, counsel necessarily creates a contrast between
the testifying co-defendant(s) and the silent defendant(s). Asking the
jury to draw the inference that a co-defendant should be rewarded for
testimony of the "missing witness" is privileged. See Wheatley v. State, 465 A.2d 1110, 1111-12
(Del. 1983) (inferences not proper because witness, an informer, was privileged and did not waive
the privilege, nor did the defendant invoke discovery provisions to compel the informer's testimony); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 286, at 201-02 (Chadbourn
rev. 1979).
94. See Bradley, supra note 39, at 1293; Poulin, supra note 39, at 222-28; Ratner, supra note
39, at 491-92.
95. Bradley, supra note 39, at 1293 (emphasis omitted).
96. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
97. 435 U.S. at 338.
98. 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (the Court held that a Tennessee statute which forced defendant to
testify prior to any of the other defense witness violated the fifth amendment).
99. 406 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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testifying simultaneously and unavoidably asks the jury to draw the
prohibited inference that silence should be penalized - i.e., that the
nontestifying defendant should be found guilty. This unwarranted and
irrational inference directly violates the fifth amendment.
Under the impermissible burden and prohibited inference models,
co-defendant commentary on silence violates a defendant's fifth
amendment rights. Recognizing such comments as unconstitutional,
however, does not bring the inquiry to an end. A further challenge
arises in identifying which comments by co-defendant's counsel are, in
fact, comments on a defendant's silence. Currently, the circuit courts
which hold a co-defendant's commentary on silence unconstitutional
are struggling to formulate a standard which effectively distinguishes
colloquy from prejudicial remarks. The next Part examines this pursuit and recommends a standard which promises to guard a defendant's fifth amendment rights more effectively.
Ill.

THE EVOLVING STANDARD FOR IDENTIFYING COMMENTS
MADE BY Co-DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL THAT VIOLATE
DEFENDANT'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

This Part explores the ways that the federal courts have dealt with
the issue of co-defendant's commentary on a defendant's silence. This
Part first explains how the courts have applied the Griffin 100 decision
to instances of prosecutorial comment on silence and identifies which
circuits have applied this same standard of impermissibility to comments by a co-defendant's counsel. This Part next demonstrates the
failure of the courts to apply this test faithfully and adequately to protect fifth amendment rights, and further criticizes the new test that has
emerged from the Eleventh Circuit. This Part concludes by advocating a new test that promises to guard the fifth amendment rights more
closely. Under this proposed test, counsel could not refer to the act of
testifying or the decision not to testify. In proposing this test, this
Note hopes to discourage courts from promoting form over substance
by allowing glib counsel to draw a defendant's silence into question
indirectly.
A. Identifying Commentary on Silence: Application of Griffin
After the Griffin decision, the duty fell upon the lower courts to
proffer a test to identify "comment by the prosecution on the accused's
silence." 101 The test that emerged, however, was not predicated on
Griffin, but instead on Wilson v. United States, 102 a decision which
100. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prosecutorial comment on defendant's silence
violates defendant's fifth amendment rights). See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
101. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
102. 149 U.S. 60 (1893); see supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
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held prosecutorial comments on silence invalid on statutory
grounds. 103 In Morrison v. United States, 104 the Eighth Circuit became
the first of the circuit courts to apply the Wilson holding. The Morrison court found the prosecution's comment impermissible since "the
language used [was] manifestly intended to be, or was . . . of such
character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a
comment on the failure of the accused to testify." 105 Almost every
court of appeals to judge prosecutorial comment since has adopted the
Morrison test. 106
Since the Griffin decision did not foreclose the argument that comments made by co-defendant's counsel may violate another defendant's fifth amendment rights, this challenge has been raised on appeal
in a number of multiple defendant trials. The judicial response has
varied from complete rejection to treatment identical to that for
prosecutorial comment and, most recently, to calls for a separate standard for judging co-defendant's comments on silence. This Part next
explores the three approaches in turn and attempts to arrive at a new
approach which most effectively protects fifth amendment rights.

B. The Sixth Circuit's Rejection of Challenges to Co-Defendant's
Comments on Silence
The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit which refuses to consider fifth
amendment challenges to a co-defendant's comments on silence. This
refusal, however, is built upon flawed reasoning. Beginning with
United States v. Griffith, 107 the Sixth Circuit has shown its reluctance
to look beyond institutional roles within the adversary process to the
deleterious effects of a co-defendant's counsel's commentary on silence. In Griffith, defendant Reynolds argued that the following ex103. 149 U.S. at 65-70. Although both the Griffin and Wilson decisions prohibit
prosecutorial comment on defendant's silence, Griffin was based on constitutional grounds while
Wilson relied on statutory grounds. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613; Wilson, 419 U.S. at 65. The
lower courts devised a test to apply Wilson, and appear to have extended this test to determine
Griffin violations. Compare Morrison v. United States, 6 F.2d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 1925) (devising
a test to apply Wilson) with United States ex rel D'Ambrosio v. Fay, 349 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir.)
(adopting the same test to identify Griffin violations), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 921 (1965).
104. 6 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1925).
105. 6 F.2d at 811 (the "Morrison test").
106. See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 983 (11th Cir. 1982); Runnels v. Hess, 653
F.2d 1359, 1361 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 825 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Hozian, 622 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d
523, 527 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Harris, 627 F.2d 474, 476 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 961 (1980); Borodine v. Douzanis, 592 F.2d 1202, 1209-10 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Muscarella, 585 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1978); Catches v. United States, 582 F.2d 453, 458 (8th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 63 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977); United States v. Wells, 431 F.2d 434, 435 (6th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 997
(1971); United States ex rel D'Ambrosio v. Fay, 349 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 921 (1965).
107. 756 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985).
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change between co-defendant's counsel and a government witness
impermissibly burdened his right to silence:
Q. So that - now, you know that Mr. Reynolds can testify in these
proceedings don't you?
A. He sure can. 108
The court held that a defendant's fifth amendment rights were "not
impaired when the comment on his silence was made by a codefendant's counsel, not by the prosecutor." 109 In so holding, the court
relied chiefly on its previous decision in United States v. Whitley. 110

In Whitley, defendant alleged that the testimony of a government
witness under cross-examination by a co-defendant's counsel
prejudiced defendant's right to post-arrest/pre-trial silence. 111 The
Whitley court refused to extend the protections offered by Doyle v.
Ohio, 11 2 which prohibited such comments by the prosecution. 113 The
Whitley court stated:
[T]he aspect of the condemned inquiry [in Doyle] that makes it reversible
error is the prosecution's emphasis on the defendant's post-arrest silence
in an effort to imply a consciousness of guilt. . . .
... Here, the question posed was not posed by the government, but
rather by counsel for co-defendant. There also was no allegation that the
government in any manner attempted to emphasize, highlight, refer to,
or utilize the testimony elicited by co-defendant's counseI.114
Arguably, the Griffith court's reliance on Whitley is misplaced
since the former dealt with the fifth amendment implications of courtroom commentary on defendant's refusal to testify while the latter
concerned the fourteenth amendment ramifications of such commentary on defendant's post-arrest silence. Whitley does, however, indicate that the prejudicial effects of such comments tum on the
commentator's identity. The central flaw with the Sixth Circuit's reasoning is the court's failure to recognize the coercive pressure these
comments place on a silent defendant. 115 When faced with the choice
of either testifying or not testifying and consequently running the risk
108. 756 F.2d at 1253.
109. 756 F.2d at 1253.
110. 734 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1984).
111. 734 F.2d at 1135-36 (the government agent stated that his investigation was limited by
the defendant's refusal after arrest to disclose any information).
112. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). The Doyle court held that the State's attempt to impeach a defendant with his post-arrest (and post-Miranda instruction) silence constituted a due process violation under the fourteenth amendment. 426 U.S. at 619. The fifth amendment implications of the
State's action were not evaluated.
113. 734 F.2d at 1136-37.
114. 734 F.2d at 1137.
115. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit's outlook on state action does not adequately address the
state's role in joining defendants with antagonistic defenses and in denying severance. See supra
note 51 and accompanying text; infra note 141.
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of having the choice of silence portrayed as a likely indication of guilt,
the fifth amendment is reduced to a hollow promise.
The Griffith court focuses on the fifth amendment's promotion of
an accusatorial justice system in which the government bears the full
burden of establishing guilt. 116 This explains the court's concern over
whether the comments on defendant's silence were directly used by
the government in proving its case. The court, however, neglects to
consider the equally integral purposes of the fifth amendment in protecting individual dignity and minimizing erroneous convictions. 117 In
light of these purposes, the fifth amendment guarantee prevents the
jury from considering defendant's failure to testify as evidence and
from drawing prohibited inferences from silence. 118 The fifth amendment is supposed to offer the protection of a " 'private enclave where
[a defendant] may lead a private life.' " 119 Allowing co-defendant's
counsel to comment adversely on a defendant's silence clearly puts
these fifth amendment policy goals in jeopardy. Moreover, encouraging a jury to equate silence with guilt and thereby ignore or give cursory attention to the facts in evidence is likely to lead to erroneous
convictions. The crucial issue therefore becomes not whether, but
how, to identify when a co-defendant's comment impermissibly burdens another defendant's fifth amendment rights.
C. Application of the Morrison Test
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit, a number of circuit courts have
recognized the potential constitutional infringement of co-defendant
commentary on silence, but have failed to devise a test for identifying
such comments which can be faithfully applied to secure fifth amendment protection. Before examining these attempts at exacting judicial
definition of prejudice, it is instructive to tum to De Luna v. United
States, 120 perhaps the premier case to hold co-defendant's comments
on silence impermissible.
Decided prior to Griffin, this Fifth Circuit case vigorously and exhaustively explores the contours of the fifth amendment. There, in an
attempt to contrast defendant Gomez's willingness to testify with defendant de Luna's silence, Gomez's attorney said: "Well, at least one
man was honest enough and had courage enough to take the stand and
subject himself to cross examination and tell you the whole story ....
116. United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir.), cen. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985). As
already indicated, ensuring a fair individual-state balance within the criminal justice system is an
important goal of the fifth amendment. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
117. See w. LAFAVE & J. lsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 1.6 (1985).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78, 94-99.
119. Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
120. 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).

1030

, Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1008

You haven't heard a word from [de Luna]." 121 Finding a violation of
defendant's fifth amendment rights, Judge Wisdom, writing for the
court, insightfully noted:
If comment on an accused's silence is improper for judge and prosecutor, it is because of the effect on the jury, not just because the comment
comes from representatives of the State....
. . . [T]he trial judge's approval of an improper comment or refusal to
disapprove the comment and do whatever is necessary to protect a defendant from being penalized by relying on his constitutional right amounts
... to sufficient participation in the comment or sanction of the comment
so that it may be properly characterized as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment .... 122
While De Luna offers a powerful argument for prohibiting co-defendant's comment on silence, it does not adequately provide a test for
determining which types of commentary impair fifth amendment
rights.1 23 Some guidance in this pursuit appears to have been provided
by the Morrison test, 124 which a number of circuits have applied to
fifth amendment challenges to co-defendant's counsel's comment on
silence. 125
A careful analysis of these circuit court cases reveals that either the
Morrison test is not applied strictly or that it is insufficient to protect
nontestifying defendants from their co-defendants' indirect forays at
silence. In most of these cases, co-defendant's counsel seeks to accentuate her client's willingness to testify; however, in doing so, counsel
often implies that silence amounts to guilt or that testimony should be
rewarded.
For instance, in United States v. Zielie 126 counsel for one of the
defendants stated in his closing: "And [my client], the evidence we've
proven, he's an honest and trustworthy man. He's one of the few
who's testified. He stood up there and the prosecution worked him
over. He was on that stand for a whole afternoon to defend his
121. 308 F.2d at 143.
122. 308 F.2d at 152, 154 (footnote omitted).
123. De Luna commands that "[i]n a criminal trial in a federal court an accused has a constitutionally guaranteed right of silence free from prejudicial comments, even when they come only
from a co-defendant's attorney." 308 F.2d at 141 (emphasis added). Yet, the court failed to
provide any guidelines on how to distinguish "prejudicial" comments.
124. Under the Morrison test, the court must consider whether the comment was "manifestly
intended to be, or was ... of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it
to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." Morrison v. United States, 6 F.2d 809,
811 (8th Cir. 1925). See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Zietie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1461 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1189 (1985); United States v. McClure, 734 F.2d 484, 491 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Aguiar, 610 F.2d 1296, 1302 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
827 (1981); United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir. 1976).
126. 734 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
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name." 127 Another more blatant example is provided in United States
v. Berkowitz, 128 where counsel for one of the defendants pleaded to the
jury: "So I ask you to evaluate and weigh in [my client's] favor the
fact that he took the stand in his own defense and he did not have to.
He did not have to present any evidence whatsoever." 129 In neither of
these cases did the court find, as required by the Morrison test, that the
comments were "manifestly intended or ... would naturally and necessarily [be taken as] a comment on" another defendant's silence. 130
As an initial matter, it seems highly plausible, if not probable, that
such commentary is intended to draw into question the nontestifying
defendant's silence and thereby subtly incriminating that defendant.
Moreover, when counsel asks the jury to reward her client for testifying, it is hard to believe that a juror would not "naturally and necessarily" take this also to be an implicit invitation to penalize the silent
defendants. Therefore, if the Morrison test were applied strictly it
would hold such comments made by co-defendant's counsel as impermissible commentary on a defendant's silence.
Furthermore, if the courts refuse to apply the Morrison test to instances of "mere favorable comment upon the fact that one of several
co-defendants testified" then the test. is not adequate. 131 The comments made by co-defendant's counsel in Zielie suggest that, first, the
testifying co-defendant is an honest and trustworthy man since he testified, and second, that only honest and trustworthy men could withstand an afternoon of cross-examination. Implicit here is the idea that
the silent defendant would have testified were he an honest and trustworthy man, and because he didn't testify he must be dishonest - i.e.,
guilty.132
127. 734 F.2d at 1461.
128. 662 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1981).
129. 662 F.2d at 1136.
130. 734 F.2d at 1461 (quoting United States v. Dearden, 546 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977)); accord, 662 F.2d at 1136.
131. 662 F.2d at 1136-37 (quoting United States v. Hodges, 502 F.2d 586, 587 (5th Cir.
1974)). A number of courts have held that a statement by counsel urging the jury to draw
favorable inferences from his client's willingness to testify is not prejudicial to the silent defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Hines, 455 F.2d 1317, 1334-35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 975 (1972); United States v.
Blue, 440 F.2d 300, 302-03 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 836 (1971); United States v. Hutul,
416 F.2d 607, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970).
132. In United States v. Hines, 455 F.2d at 1334-35, the D.C. Circuit addressed similar codefendant's comments and based its decision on a comparison to the comments found impermissible in De Luna. In Hines, defendant Ware's counsel, emphasizing his client's willingness to
testify, remarked: "[Y]ou and I, if we were innocent, we would take the stand to try to exonerate
ourselves. • . ." 455 F.2d at 1334. The court held that "the De Luna case involved a more
serious trespass on the accused's Fifth Amendment rights." 455 F.2d at 1334.
Chief Judge Bazelon, in dissent, noted "the comments made by [co-defendant] Ware's counsel were not 'innocuous' and served to point out not that [defendant] Hines had a right to remain
silent but that the innocent would not exercise that right." 455 F.2d at 1335 (footnote omitted).
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Moreover, asking the jury to draw a favorable inference from the
act of testifying, as in Berkowitz, drastically undermines the purposes
of the fifth amendment. It is obviously fair and necessary for the jury
to consider a defendant's testimony and his demeanor on the stand
from the standpoint both of determining facts and witness credibility.
However, if the very act of testifying is rewarded, the silent defendant
will suffer from the negative presumption that silence will create. It is
not merely the damage done to a nontestifying defendant by this implicit deprecation of silence, but the perversion of a criminal justice
system designed to treat testimony and silence as equal, nonpresumptive choices and to place the entire burden of proof on the state's
shoulders.
D.

The Eleventh Circuit's Mena Test

The most recent and troubling judicial response to the issue of codefendant comment on silence has come from the Eleventh Circuit.
Dissatisfied with the application of the Morrison test - with its origins
in prosecutorial comment on silence - to co-defendant's counsel's
comments on silence, the Eleventh Circuit has proposed a test which
promises to allow more damaging and constitutionally suspect commentary by co-defendant's counsel. This section discusses this test
and demonstrates its inadequacy when viewed in light of fifth amendment goals.
In United States v. Mena, 133 the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the
criminal narcotics conviction of eight defendants, six of whom challenged certain comments made by one testifying defendant's counsel in
his closing argument. Counsel was attempting to explain his inability
to corroborate his client's story beyond the corroboration offered by
the other testifying defendant, Mr. Zuniga. Counsel stated:
Now, this is difficult to be in this situation where you have - where
all these defendants are here together. I can't call witnesses....
Again, I can't call any of these other people to say the same thing [as
Zuniga said] ....
. . . Mr. Zuniga got up on the stand .... He got up on the stand and
the others didn't get up on the stand, and that's a right to get up on the
stand. That's an absolute right. There is nothing wrong with that. He
got up on the stand. 134

Appropriately, the court recognized that were it to apply the Morrison test, it would have to conclude that such comments would " 'naturally and necessarily' " be interpreted by the jury as a comment on
Bazelon emphasized that "[i]f a co-defendant in a criminal trial chooses to remain silent, all
commentary which invites an inference of guilt must be avoided." 455 F.2d at 1335-36.
133. 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 110 (1989).
134. 863 F.2d at 1533.
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defendant's silence. 135 The court, however, distinguished this case
from those Eleventh Circuit cases in which this standard had been
used because those cases involved mere favorable comment on a defendant's willingness to testify, while in Mena "we are presented with an
actual reference to the silence of the six defendants." 136 In effect, the
court suggested that when a clearer violation of defendant's fifth
amendment rights occurs, the Morrison test is too easily satisfied and a
test promising reduced protection for silent defendants should be used.
In addition, the Mena court noted that the Mo"ison test is derived
from cases of improper prosecutorial comment on silence. With respect to this genesis the court posited:
Given the prosecutor's institutional role, when the prosecutor merely
"comments" on the failure of an accused to testify, the reference is in all
likelihood calculated to encourage the jury to equate silence with guilt;
reasonable judicial economy thus permits a finding of reversible error.
When the "comment" comes from an actor (such as counsel for a codefendant) without an institutional interest in the defendant's guilt, however, it would be inappropriate to find reversible error as a matter of
course. 131

The court proposed a new test for assessing co-defendant comment on
silence: "whether the comment actually or implicitly invited the jury
to infer guilt from silence." 138 Consequently and counter-intuitively,
the court concluded that direct comment on defendant's silence exposes the Morrison test as overly protective of defendant's rights and
propounded a test designed to enable greater latitude in co-defendant's
counsePs comments on defendant's silence.
First, to say that the Morrison test results in a finding of reversible
error as a "matter of course" is to distort gravely the truth. The only
case where co-defendant comments have been found to impair silence
unconstitutionally is De Luna, and in that decision the Morrison test
was not even invoked. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit cases, United
States v. Zielie and United States v. Vera, to which the Mena court
refers, both held that the Morrison test had not been violated. 139
Lastly, even if the Morrison test does result in a more frequent finding
of fifth amendment infringement than does the new Mena test, this
should be recognized as the necessary price paid to secure constitutional protections.
135. 863 F.2d at 1533 (quoting United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1461 (11th Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1989); United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983)).
136. 863 F.2d at 1534 (contrasting Zie/ie, 734 F.2d 1447 and Vera;101 F.2d 1349 with the
present case).
137. 863 F.2d at 1534 (emphasis added).
138. 863 F.2d at 1534. The court went on to find that under this test that the comments at
issue did not prejudice the silent defendants' fifth amendment rights. 863 F.2d at 1535.
139. United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1461-62 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1189 (1985); United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1363 (11th Cir. 1983). Although these cases
do not explicitly mention Morrison, the test they use is, in fact, that used in Morrison.
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The Mena court also raises a curious argument with respect to the
role of the speaker and the intent of his comment. The court suggests
that a co-defendant's counsel lacks the institutional intent to lead the
jury to infer guilt from silence. The court overlooks the considerable
benefits to be gained from throwing the blame on one's co-defendant.140 By subtly leading the jury to conclude that silence masks
guilt, defense counsel can implicate his co-defendant without triggering the need for a severance.141
Furthermore, the Mena test focuses too closely on the intent of the
comment, rather than its effects. A test relying on whether the jury
was "invited" to infer guilt from silence neglects to consider the deleterious effects flowing from an objectively unintended comment. 14 2
While malicious intent to impair constitutional rights should be deterred, the primary purpose of such a test should be to guard against
the infringement of rights. The Mo"ison test speaks more clearly to
this primary purpose by holding impermissible comments "naturally
and necessarily" taken to be inferences of guilt by silence. It would be
little consolation to a defendant if the jury inferred a defendant's guilt
because of a comment not intended to cause this effect.
In the final analysis, the Mena test affords inadequate protection of
fifth amendment rights and encourages co-defendant forays at defendant's privileged silence. This standard for impermissibility leaves the
defendant's constitutional right to unfettered silence at the mercy of a
co-defendant's intention. While the Morrison test offers firmer protection for silence, as applied by the courts it does not adequately prevent
140. See Dunmore, Comment on Failure ofAccused to Testify, 26 YALE L.J. 464, 467 (1917).
141. In federal court, "[t]wo or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction ••••" FED. R.
CRIM. P. 8(b). A shrewd co-defendant might recognize that his innocence is more likely to be
recognized by a jury when the jury has another defendant available to convict. Plainly, there are
certain strategic advantages that accrue to jointly-tried defendants with antagonistic defenses.
This in no way implies that joinder would always benefit defendants with antagonistic defenses.
For instance, one defendant may not wish to appear before a jury in the presence of another
defendant who is unlikely, for whatever reason, to provoke jury sympathy.
Because the judiciary has embraced having joint trials, severance, even in cases of truly antagonistic defenses, is difficult to obtain. Actually, the "mere fact that there is hostility between
defendants or that one may try to save himself at the expense of another is in itself alone not
sufficient grounds to require separate trials." United States v. Hutu), 416 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.
1969) (quoting Dauer v. United States, 189 F.2d 343, 344 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898
(1951)). Nonetheless, creating the implication that one defendant's decision not to testify reflects
his guilt, aids the testifying defendant's case and offers less fodder for severance than direct
accusation.
142. To understand the Mena test's failures, consider whether the court should allow a codefendant's attorney to say in her closing: "You will notice, of course, that defendant X testified
today while defendant Y did not." Strictly applying the Mena test, it is arguable that this comment does not "invite" a prohibited inference. However, it poses a great enough risk to defendant Y's fifth amendment rights compared to its minimal legitimate purpose that it should be
impermissible. It is simply unnecessary and of dubious benevolent intent to point out, however
indirectly, another defendant's decision not to testify.
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indirect adverse commentary on silence. 143

E. A Proposal for a Standard of Impermissible Co-Defendant
Commentary on Defendant's Courtroom Silence
Because of the insufficient protections for silence currently afforded by the Morrison and Mena tests a new rule is in order: a defendant's counsel should not be permitted to refer to the fact that either
his client or another defendant testified or chose not to testify. Counsel should be permitted to comment on the content of testimony before
the court and the witnesses' credibility since this constitutes evidence
upon which the jury can legitimately base its verdict. The act of testifying or the willingness to do so, however, does not and should not
constitute probative evidence if the fifth amendment is to be accorded
proper respect. A closing argument that accentuates a defendant's
willingness to testify and the link between his innocence or honesty
and his decision to testify necessarily draws jury speculation on other
defendants' silence. For the fifth amendment to operate effectively,
the justice system cannot allow silence to be manipulated by defense
counsel for evidentiary purposes.
The Morrison test is inadequate not because of its wording or
structure, but because of the court's inability to apply it faithfully.
The Mena test does not offer any greater guidance to the courts. As
indicated, this new test may, in fact, place effective fifth amendment
protection in greater jeopardy than the Morrison test. Despite these
two tests, numerous decisions indicate that counsel for a testifying codefendant is consistently permitted to refer indirectly to another
defendant's refusal to testify. 144 Whether such commentary comes in
the form of a remark on the co-defendant's "exemplary" willingness to
testify 145 or counsel's inability to corroborate his client's story, 146 the
jury is unavoidably sent a second message. Underlying such seemingly
benign comments is the implicit invitation to the jury to speculate on
the motives for the nontestifying defendant's silence. Faithful application of the Morrison and Mena tests would indicate the specious nature of such remarks. Yet, because of the judiciary's reluctance to
pursue the implications of this commentary on silence, allegiance to
the principles of fifth amendment protection can only be secured by
prohibiting all commentary on the act of testifying or on the limitations imposed on some defendants by another defendant's silence.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 124-32.
144. See supra notes 107-10, 126-30, 133-38 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1189 (1985); United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 126-32.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 110
(1989). See supra text accompanying notes 133-43.
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The ideal solution to this problem would be to eliminate multiple
defendant trials. The conventional wisdom, however, is that
"[u]nquestionably, joint trials are more economical and minimize the
burden on witnesses, prosecutors, and courts. They also avoid delays
in bringing those accused of crime to trial." 147 Nevertheless, the prejudice and confusion inherent in joint trials is manifold. Among the
commonly recognized problems are complexity leading to jury confusion, guilt by association, prejudice emanating from co-defendants'
confessions implicating defendants, antagonistic defenses, conflicts in
trial strategy, and co-defendants' criminal records. 148 Yet, as long as
multiple defendant trials continue to be perceived as "cost effective"
this practice undoubtedly will continue. In the alternative, therefore,
comments by co-defendant's counsel on defendant's silence must be
proscribed.
Some may argue that denying a defendant the opportunity to point
out his decision to testify prevents counsel from zealously representing
the client and hurts that defendant. In this instance, a defendant suffers minimal detriment. The jury will, of course, recognize the fact
that a defendant testified without a reminder from counsel. Furthermore, any advantage that defendant might accrue from testifying
comes at the price of prejudicing another defendant's constitutional
choice.
Under the proposed test, to prevent such prejudice, counsel would
not be permitted to say: "Remember, only my client was secure
enough in his innocence to testify today" or "Unfortunately the other
defendants' constitutionally protected decision not to testify prevents
me from further corroborating my client's story." Applying this
Note's proposed standard, these remarks clearly refer to the act of testifying and not to the content of the testimony or the defendant's credibility. If a timely objection is made, the judge should instruct the jury
to disregard this comment and should reiterate the nonpresumptive
nature of the decision not to testify. If the silent defendants are convicted and challenge on appeal the remarks made on their silence, the
appeals court should, using the proposed test, recognize these comments as pertaining to the act of testifying and then determine whether
these actions constituted prejudicial or harmless error in this case.1 49
147. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968) (White, J., dissenting); see also Rich·
ardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987) ("Joint trials play a vital role in the criminal justice
system •... ").
148. See Calo, Joint Trials, Spillover Prejudice, and the Ineffectiveness of a Bare Limiting
Instruction, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 21, 35 (1985) ('~oint trials result in prejudices that burden a
defendant's right to a fair trial."); see generally Dawson, Joint Trials of Defendants in Criminal
Cases: An Analysis of Efficiencies and Prejudices, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1379 (1979). Professor
Dawson concludes that "(t]he uncertain benefits ofjoint trials and the mischief they so frequently
work justify a statute or rule of court giving defendants rights to separate trials." Id. at 1452.
149. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (holding that a Griffin error does not

1
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CONCLUSION

This Note addresses the undermining of constitutional protections
by attorneys who choose to exploit the joining of testifying and nontestifying defendants. Because of the perceived efficiency of joint trials,
however, greater judicial grants of severance are unlikely. Therefore,
judges have a duty to administer a judicial system in which the Constitution affords realistic protection against compulsion to testify. The
tests created thus far to identify co-defendant's commentary on a defendant's privileged silence have proved ineffective and unfair to the
silent defendant. Under the current standards, courts run the great
risk of encouraging the jury to reward testimony and penalize silence.
Consequently, in order to uphold the promise that the fifth amendment holds forth to all criminal defendants, co-defendant's counsel
should not be permitted to comment on any defendant's decision
either to testify or remain silent.
Subtle attempts to suggest that the refusal to testify signifies guilt
subvert the constitutional framework upon which the American criminal justice systems rests. Statements by co-defendant's attorneys on
their client's willingness to testify or on the.problems of corroborating
the testifying defendant's story due to another defendant's silence
serve a minimal legitimate purpose while potentially putting into jeopardy the nonpresumptive quality of a constitutionally protected
choice. Such a practice runs counter to the fifth amendment's historical purpose and subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court.

- Martin D. Litt

require automatic reversal and that the reviewing court should affirm a conviction if it finds the
error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

